University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1972

Minnesota Homestead Tax Exemption-Discrimination Based on Wealth
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Minnesota Homestead Tax Exemption--Discrimination Based on Wealth" (1972). Minnesota Law
Review. 3018.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3018

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

1121

Note: The Minnesota Homestead Tax ExemptionDiscrimination Based on Wealth
I.

INTRODUCTION

Real property taxation has long been unpopular;

until

recently there has been little scholarly analysis enthusiastically
endorsing the real property tax.1 Property taxes have recently
come under renewed attack as the basis for financing public education.2 However, despite continued criticism, the property
tax remains the primary source of tax revenue for municipalities
in the United States-in 1970 it accounted for 84.9% of all local
3

tax revenues.

Whereas most of the attacks have been aimed primarily at

the tax itself, this note will focus on the implementation of real
property taxation, with particular emphasis on the Minnesota
homestead property tax exemption. Possible grounds for legal
challenge will be suggested, and remedial legislation aimed at
curing some of the inequities will be outlined.
The history of real property taxation in the United States
has been outlined elsewhere 4 and need not be detailed here.
Suffice it to say that the general property tax in the United
States is uniquely American,5 and that the constitutional and
legislative development proceeded more or less independently in
each state, with certain broad trends emerging.0 That fact,
coupled with inevitable local peculiarities in administration, severely restricts the utility of broad generalization with respect
to particular facets of property taxation in other states. Accordingly, this note will focus primarily on the Minnesota situation.
The homestead tax exemption in the United States-a par1. The strength of the feeling is exemplified in J. JzNswN, PaopTHE UNITm STATEs 478 (1931).
But see Gaffney,

ERTY TAXATION

The Property Tax is a Progressive Tax (paper presented at 64th

Annual Conference of the National Tax Association, Sept. 28, 1971).
2.

See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.

Rptr. 601 (1971).
3. UimED STATES DEPARTmEm oF COMMECE, BuREAu
CENsus, GoVERNMNTAL FIxANcEs IN 1969-70, at 5 (1971).
4. See J. JENsEN, supra note 1, at 19-47.
5. Id. at 19.
6. Id. at 35-47.
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tial rather than complete exemption-was a child of the depression, instituted to help abate the rash of tax forfeitures at
that time. 7 However, with few exceptions it remained after this
threat to home ownership subsided. Presently, the homestead
tax exemption can be found in 11 states.8 Although there are
important variations, the laws are similar in general operation.
Available only to heads of families who own and occupy the
homestead property, the homestead exemption serves to reduce
The actual
the tax assessment on the homestead propertyY
amount of the reduction in taxes also varies considerably, depending on the state, the value of the property, the extent of
the exemption and the size of the tax levy. With this generalized background, this note will focus on the operation of the
homestead tax exemption in Minnesota, and on its younger companion, homestead tax relief.
II. REAL PROPERTY TAXATION IN MINNESOTA
Any attempt to present a readily understandable outline of
the mechanics of property taxation in Minnesota, with its proliferation of classes of property, is difficult in itself. However,
an additional obstacle is the fact that a dual description is necessary because of 1971 legislative changes in several pertinent
statutory provisions. Although most of the changes are formal
rather than substantive and tend to simplify the system, it is
7.
NANCE

Kilpatrick, Homestead Exemption Reexamined, 32 MUN. Fl114 (1960).

8. The states are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Texas and West Virginia. Kilpatrick, supra note 7, at 114-15. Various articles discuss particular state
provisions: Florida-Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, the Florida
Homestead Exemption: V, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 346 (1949); Hunt,
Taxation Under a New Constitution, 41 FLA. B.J. 388 (1967); HawaiiLeong & Kamins, Property Taxation in the 50th State, 14 NAT'L TAX J.
59, 63 (1961); Iowa-Crosser, Iowa Tries Homestead Tax Exemption,
28 NAT'L MUN. REV. 200 (1939); Thompson, Homestead Tax Reduction, 22 IowA L. REV. 633 (1937); Louisiana-Reynard, Louisiana Homestead Tax Exemption-An Unlitigated Constitutional Provision, 10 LA.
L. REV. 405 (1950); Mississippi-Arant, Homestead Tax Exemption in
Mississippi, 11 Miss. L.J. 167 (1938); Satterfield, Mississippi Provides
Tax-Free Homes, 28 NAT'L MUN. REV. 365 (1939); Oklahoma-Logan,
Oklahoma Tax Exemption Law, 14 TAXES 79 (1936); Melton, Homestead Tax Exemption in TAX EXEMPTON 188 (1939); Texas-Anderson,

Constitutional Aspects of Revenue and Taxation in Texas, 35 TaX. L.
REV. 1011, 1019-21 (1957); West Virginia-Thompson, Effects of Property

Tax Limitation in West Virginia,4 NAT'L TAX J. 129 (1951).
9. Kilpatrick, supra note 7, at 114.
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possible that they might lead to confusion. Therefore both the
recently effected changes and the previously existing system
will be described. Since all of the available tables and figures
are based on the earlier system, herein designated the "old system," most of the examples given will be based on that system,
with reference to the "new system" either parenthetically or by
way of footnote.
A. IN GENMUL
1. Constitutiona and statutory provisions
Minnesota has a classified property tax. This is made possible by Article 9, Section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution, which
provides for uniformity of taxes "upon the same class of subjects." The statutory provisions governing property taxation
are found in Chapters 272 through 284 of the Minnesota Statutes,
with pertinent classification provisions in Chapter 273.
2. Assessment-Value
In Minnesota the task of assessment is assigned to designated county officials. 10 Traditionally assessment has been a
three step process. First a determination of market value was
made." The second step involved the calculation of "full and
true value," or adjusted market value, by taking one third of
the actual market value.' 2 The third step involved computation
of "assessed value" by application of the appropriate percentage
to the adjusted market value of the property, depending on its
classification (as discussed below).
The 1971 changes, which went into effect January 2, 1972,
simplify the process by eliminating step two. The "new system"
makes actual market value the basis for all assessment.' 3 Note
that under the new system the assessment figures for any property will be three times as great as under the old system. Ac10.
11.

See generally Mnm. STAT. §§ 273.04-.08 (1969) (as amended).
Mpm. STAT. § 273.11 (1969) (as amended).
MINN. STAT. § 272.03(12) (1969)
(repealed 1971). That pro-

12.
vision allowed the assessor to apply a uniform percentage of market

value. In practice, and by guidelines set by the Commissioner of
Taxation, that percentage was 33%%. MnNESOTA DEPARTM T OF
EcoxONAnc DEVELOPMENT, MxNESOTA TAx GUME 8 (1970).
13. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 427, § 26 repealed Mnnm. STAT. § 272.03
(12) (1969). Now MnbN. STAT. § 273.11 (1969) (as amended) controls.
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cordingly, implementation requires a corresponding two thirds
reduction of the tax levy rates to maintain the equilibrium. 14
3.

Classification

Minnesota's extensive classification of property is unique.
The state has chosen to use property classification to single out
such diverse types of property as parking ramps, 15 petroleum refineries,' 6 and such diverse groups of owners as paraplegic veterans and blind homeowners.' 7 As a result, Minnesota has at
least 16 classes of real property, each subject to a different percentage valuation for assessment purposes.
The particular
classification which is the concern of this note is class 3c-nonagricultural homestead.' 8
B. THE

HOMESTEAD TAX EXEMPTION

For property tax purposes, land qualifies as a homestead if
it is occupied as the owner's principal place of dwelling.10 Once
qualified, the assessed value (under the old system) is determined as follows: 25% of the first $4,000 of adjusted market
value, plus 40% of all additional adjusted market value (under
the new system, 25% of the first $12,000 of market value, plus
40% of the additional value) .20 For non-homestead residential
property the appropriate percentage is a straight 40%.21 At
this stage the mill levy is applied to determine the tax. Table 1
compares the old and new systems for determination of the mill
value for a homestead dwelling with a market value of $24,000.
14. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 427, § 24 requires such reduction where

maximum tax rates are imposed.
15. MINN. STAT. § 273.13(14) (1969) (as amended).
16. MINN. STAT. § 273.13(13) (1969) (as amended).
17. MIN. STAT. § 273.13(7) (1969) (as amended).

18. Id. It is recognized, however, that much of this note's analysis
would apply with equal force to other aspects of the classification system-e.g., urban vs. rural.
19. See Op. ATr'Y GEN. MINN. no. 795 (1933) [1934 vol.]. Interestingly, for purposes of the property tax relief provision for senior
citizens the homestead is defined to include rented dwellings-even in
"multi-dwellings."

MINN. STAT. §

290.0601 (1969) (as amended).

20. MiNN. STAT. § 273.13 (7) (1969) contained the old provisions.
The new version of that section is found in Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 31,
art. 22, § 8 (Extra Session).

21. Prior to the 1971 legislative changes, all property not included
in the 14 other classes was placed in class 4 and assessed at 40% of
adjusted value. MINN. STAT. § 273.13(9) (1969). However, the 1971
changes place residential real estate in class 3d, still assessed at 40%,
and raise the class 4 assessment to 43%. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 31, art.
22, §§ 6, 7 (Extra Session).
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Table 1. Comparison of "old" and "new" systems for mill value

determination for $24,000 dwelling qualifying for class 3c (urban
homestead) treatment.
New system
Old system
$24,000
Market value
$24,000
Market value
Full and true value

8,000

Assessed value:

Assessed value:
(25% x $4,000)

(40% x $4,000)

1,000

1,600

(25% x $12,000)

(40% x $12,000)

$2.60

4,800

$ 7,800

$ 2,600

One mill

3,000

One mill

$7.80

C. HomiSTEAD TAX REUiEF-RENT CREDIT
At this point note should be made of the homestead tax
relief provisions enacted in 1967. Under these provisions, the
property taxes for a homestead are reduced by 35% of the levy
(exclusive of charges attributable to reduction of principal or
interest on bonded indebtedness) up to $250.22 Even though this
serves to reduce property taxes of homeowners in a manner
similar to the homestead exemption, it is mentioned separately
since the taxing jurisdiction is reimbursed out of a special state
fund for the revenues lost.23 As will be seen, the funds lost as
a result of the homestead exemption are not subject to reimbursement, and the loss is made up for, at least in part, by increased levies on the other classes of property. This will be of
significance in establishing direct injury to a potential class of

plaintiffs.
At the same time the legislature passed the homestead tax
relief provisions, it enacted legislation which allowed renters,
under certain circumstances, to claim a rent credit against income taxes of up to $45.24 In 1971 the amount was increased to
$90.25 The rent credit is intended to mitigate the tax burden on
of the two relief
renters and the significance and relationship
20
provisions will be examined in a later section.
D. TAX LEVY AND COLLECTION
The individual tax statement for any given piece of property
will be comprised of levies from three prime taxing jurisdictions:
Since
the school district, the county and the city or village.2
1967 the state has not relied on any revenues generated through
22. MiNw. STAT. § 273.13 (7) (1969) (as amended).
23. Vmn. STAT. § 273.13(15) (1969) (as amended).
24.

MiNN. STAT. §§ 290.981-.992 (1969).

25. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 31, art. 8, § 6 (Extra Session).
26.

See text accompanying notes 151-53 infra.

27. See generally M mN.STAT. ch. 275 (1969).
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statewide property taxes. 28 Each of the levies is determined by
first dividing the total revenue required by the total assessed
value of property in the particular jurisdiction to obtain the mill
rate, and then by applying that rate to each piece of property.
On a statewide basis, the average property tax dollar breaks
down as follows: 56% to school districts, 23.7% to counties, 18.4%
to cities and villages, and 1.9% to special taxing districts and
townships. 29 The various county treasurers prepare the tax
statements, receive payments and distribute the revenues to the
30
respective taxing jurisdictions.
III.

THE EFFECT OF THE EXEMPTIONHOMEOWNER VS. RENTER
The purpose of this section is to point out the significance
of the difference in tax burdens on homeowners and renters.
Part of this discussion rests on the theory that renters bear the
burden of the taxes through rents. The assumption will be discussed at length in a later section.
Table 2 gives tax burdens for dwelling units of different values. 31 The calculations are based on the 1971 tax levy in Minneapolis, the most populous city in Minnesota. The additional
burdens borne by renters are expressed as a percentage difference. The percentage differences for assessed valuation would
be the same for the entire state, and the percentage differences
for total tax paid (which considers both the homestead tax relief
and the rent credit) would vary slightly, depending on local
conditions. Of course, actual dollar differences would depend on
the local tax levies. The validity of the comparison of amounts
paid after subtraction of homestead tax relief credit and rent
credit is subject to debate, and will be discussed in a later section.
As indicated, the calculations are based on the 1971 Minneapolis
levy, which was 353.03 mills. The range of tax levies in Minnesota varied between 256.07 and 678.91, 32 with Minneapolis rates
representing about the state average.
28.

MINN. STAT.

§ 6.33(3)

(1969)

contains the provisions for fund-

ing the appropriations formerly funded by a statewide property tax
levy.
29. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MINNESOTA
TAx GUIDE 6 (1970).
30. See generally MINN. STAT. ch. 276 (1969).
31. At this point the concept of "dwelling unit" will be dealt with
abstractly. The issue of the equivalence of, for example, an apartment
in a multi-unit building and a home situated on its own lot will be
dealt with infra.
32. Ellefson, 1971 Property Values, Tax Levies and Rates, 56 MINN.

MUNIcIPAmTIES 108 (1971).
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There is not a great deal of explanation or interpretation
required. The figures based on assessment alone, before any reduction for additional tax credits, indicate an additional tax burden on non-homestead property of 60% up to $12,000 market
value. At that point the absolute dollar difference maximizes
and stabilizes (at $212 in Minneapolis in 1971), and the percentage
differences decrease with increased value. The disparity in total
taxes paid, even allowing the $90 reduction for rent credit, is
even greater. With the values taken, the percentage disparity
is greatest again at the $12,000 level, with the non-homestead
dwelling paying 94% greater property taxes (absent reduction
for rent credit the tax at that stratum is more than double the
homestead tax). The absolute dollar difference increases up to
the $24,000 dwelling, at which point it stabilizes (at $372 in
Minneapolis in 1971).
It is apparent that the greatest percentage disparity exists
in the lower ranges of value. Since those who fall into poverty
categories occupy the lower value dwellings, the question arises
as to whether it follows that the disparities in taxation constitute discrimination based on relative wealth. That issue forms
the basis for much of the discussion in the next section.
IV.

SUGGESTED LEGAL ATTACK

A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The essential constitutional requirements which must be
met are those of uniformity and equal protection. Article 9,
Section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution provides, inter alia,
that "[taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects
"
Amendment 14 to the United States Constitution pro.
hibits denial by a state of equal protection of the law to any
person within its jurisdiction.
B.

STARE DECiSiS-THE OBSTACLES

The chief obstacle to a successful legal challenge to the
Minnesota homestead exemption is the case of Apartment Operators' Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis.33 In that case the plaintiff
organization brought an action to enjoin the city from assessing
real property for taxation purposes in accordance with the pro33.

191 Minn. 365, 254 N.W. 443 (1934), noted in 18

751 (1934).

MINN.

L.

REv.
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visions of the 1933 law enacting the homestead tax exemption.?

On appeal from an order dismissing the action, the Minnesota
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed on both uniformity and
equal protection grounds. Pointing out that the classification
was based upon use of the property, the court said that the
"difference in use of the property has a fair and substantial relation to that object of the legislature [encouraging home ownership], and there is no discrimination between persons in similar circumstances; it operates equally upon all coming within
the respective classes." 35
In a companion case, Logan v. Young, 36 the court upheld
the homestead provisions against the privileges and immunities
challenge of a nonresident proprietor. Three years later, in

510 Groveland Ave., Inc. v. Erickson,37 relying on Apartment
Operators', the Minnesota Supreme Court again sustained the
homestead exemption provisions against attack on uniformity
grounds.
C.

1.

CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS

Uniformity vs. Equal Protection: Is There a Difference?

The first issue that must be faced in ascertaining constitutional standards is whether there is in fact any difference between the requirements of uniformity and equal protection.
Various states take different approaches to the question, but it
has been considered the trend to treat uniformity and equal
protection requirements as identical. 38 Although there are conflicting statements in the Minnesota cases, it can be said as a
general rule that Minnesota would espouse such an interpretation. In Reed v. Bjornson, the Minnesota Supreme Court said
that "equality of protection includes uniformity of application to
the subject of taxation and that our uniformity clause is not
more restrictive than the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." 39 Accordingly, this analysis will treat the
34. The original provision is found in Minn. Laws 1933, ch. 359.
35. 191 Minn. at 369, 254 N.W. at 445.
36. 191 Minn. 371, 254 N.W. 446 (1934).
37.

201 Minn. 381, 276 N.W. 287 (1937).

38. Matthews, The Function of Constitutional Provisions Requiring Uniformity in Taxation, 38 Ky. L.J. 31, 61-66 (1949).
39. 191 Minm. 254, 261, 253 N.W. 102, 105 (1934). Cf. In re Cold

Spring Granite Co., 271 Minn. 460, 466, 136 N.W.2d 782, 787 (1965); C.
Thomas Stores Sales System, Inc. v. Spaeth, 209 Minn. 504, 514, 297
N.W. 9, 16 (1941).
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uniformity and equal protection requirements as interchangeable. Where citations are given referring to one or the other, it
will be presumed that application could be made to either.
2.

The Requirements as Enunciated by the Courts

There is an overlap of federal and state authority in this
area. The Minnesota Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted the Minnesota uniformity provisions and set constitutional standards. Similarly, there is a large body of material
pertaining to equal protection requirements as applied to taxation. This section will first delineate the specific requirements
that have been established by the Minnesota Supreme Court,
and then examine the broader range of equal protection material.
In Reed v. Bjornson, citing several authorities, the Minnesota Supreme Court set down the basic standards of uniformity:
The classification must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or, as
is sometimes said, capricious. It must rest on some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike .... It must operate "equally
and uniformly
upon all persons in similar circumstances." 40
With respect to taxation of property, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has held that the classification "must be based on differences furnishing a reasonable ground for distinction," and that
a reasonable classification based on the use made of the property
41
would be valid.
The application of equal protection standards to taxation
presents some additional problems, having been treated as a
40. 191 Minn. at 264-65, 253 N.W. at 107, citing Magoun v. Bank,
170 U.S. 283 (1898).
41. Apartment Operators' Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 191 Minn.
365, 367, 254 N.W. 443, 444 (1934), quoting Dohs v. Holm, 152 Minn. 529,
533, 189 N.W. 418, 420 (1922). Although not, of course, binding in Minnesota, there are numerous uniformity decisions from other jurisdictions of some interest. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393, 35
N.W.2d 66, superseding 31 N.W.2d 110 (1948), appeal dismissed, 338
U.S. 843 (1949) (ruling on constitutionality of Agricultural Land Credit
Law, first declaring law unconstitutional, then reversing and finding
law constitutional on rehearing); Apache County v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. Ry. Co., 106 Ariz. 356, 476 P.2d 657 (1970) (upholding classification
of railroad property at higher valuation than other property); John Wanamaker, Philadelphia v. School District, 441 Pa. 567, 274 A.2d 524 (1971)
(upholding use or occupancy tax on commercial use of real estate as
valid privilege tax).
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departure from "orthodox" equal protection application. 42 Rather than applying the "rational classification" approach, the United States Supreme Court has traditionally approached such tax
cases on an ad hoc basis, searching for pragmatic answers in
of "complete judicial
individual cases, 43 usually with an4 attitude
4
deference to legislative judgment."
Although the United States Supreme Court has rarely espoused the rational classification approach, it has been forcefully
argued that such approach is indeed most appropriate.4 In that
the Minnesota Supreme Court has declared that the uniformity
and equal protection requirements are identical,"4 and has articulated the rational classification standard of analysis for uniformity cases, 47 this standard will be viewed as a possible equal
protection standard, indeed, as the "conventional" standard.
It seems appropriate, however, to consider an additional
equal protection standard in this analysis. Characterized as
activist in nature, the "suspect classifications" approach views
certain classifications as inherently suspect, and applies a more
rigorous constitutional standard in analyzing the proffered justifications. 4" Originally applied to racial classification,4 9 this approach has gradually been expanded to classifications tending
to impair the voting franchise,50 and to those based on wealth. 5 '
It has been suggested that application of suspect classification
status might ultimately be made to discrimination in prosecution, bail, sentencing and public aid.52 When a classification is
deemed to be suspect, the standard rational classification test is
transcended, and stronger, more compelling justification re42. Note, Rational Classification Problems in Financing State and
Local Government, 76 YALE L.J. 1206 (1967).
43. Sholley, Equal Protection in Tax Legislation, 24 VA. L. REv.
229, 232 (1938).

44. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37

CALIF. L. REv. 341, 369 (1949).

45. Note, Rational Classification Problems in Financing State and
Local Government, 76 YALE L.J. 1206 (1967).
46. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
48. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv.L. REv.
1065, 1087-1132 (1969).
49. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (exclusion
of Negroes from juries by law).
50. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
51. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

52. See discussion and references in Coons, Clune & Sugarman,
Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State
FinancialStructures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305, 346-51 (1969).

1132

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1121

quired.58 The suspect classification test is frequently employed
in conjunction with the so-called "fundamental interest" test.'
These two standards and their interaction will be discussed at
greater length in a subsequent section.
3.

Summary

The following portion of this note will analyze the Minnesota homestead tax exemption provisions in light of the various
constitutional standards described above. The uniformity and
equal protection requirements will be viewed as substantially
identical. The first segment of the analysis will examine whether the classification is indeed rational, and specifically whether
the classification is really based on the use of the property. The
second part will examine the classification from the perspective
of whether it constitutes a suspect classification, and whether it
impinges on "fundamental interests."
D.

RATIONAL CLASSIFICATION

The first objection to the Minnesota homestead tax exemption is that it is not in fact a rational classification. As indicated
above, a three part standard has been enunciated by the Minnesota Supreme Court for judging the rationality of a classification: (1) the basis of the classification must be substantially
related to the object of the legislation; (2) there must be a reasonable ground for distinction; and (3) it must operate equally and
uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances. 5
1. Relation to Object of Legislation
One must first look to the object of the legislation. The
homestead tax exemption laws were passed during the depression
to avert the high rate of tax forfeitures of owner-occupied
homes. 6 This was at a time when tax rates were very high
relative to the depressed values of real estate, and relative to the
generally experienced diminished earning power of the populace
as a whole. The simple fact is that the conditions giving rise to
53.
54.

Developments in the Law, supra note 48, at 1076-1107.
Id. at 1120-22.

55.
56.

See notes 40-41 supra,and accompanying text.
This is so widely acknowledged as to be a truism. See, e.g.,
Kilpatrick, supra note 7; GOVERNOR'S MINNESOTA TAX STUDY COMMITTEE,
REPORT OF THE GovERNoR's MINNESOTA TAX STUDY COMMITTEE 5-11, 12

(1962); Op. ATT'Y GEN. MNN. no. 795 (1933)

[1934 vol.].
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the original purpose of the laws do not exist today. In 1934,
during the depression, when most of the homestead exemption
laws were passed, property taxes were equivalent to 6.3% of the
gross national product,57 and many home owners faced forfeiture
from tax as well as mortgage delinquency. Those conditions no
longer prevail. In recent years property taxes equalled only
about 3.3% of GNP, less than the pre-depression level.58 Viewed
in relation to its original purpose, the homestead exemption is
an anachronism.
Notwithstanding the original scope of legislative purpose,
the courts have extended that purpose in sustaining these exemptions. In Apartment Operators'Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis,
the court said:
Such classification has a tendency to encourage the use of land
for homestead purposes and is in furtherance of a sound public
policy. The stability of government is promoted thereby.59

Accordingly, the purpose has been extended to encompass a land
use policy rather than a tax relief measure, presumably temporary in scope.
It is contended, first, that this statement of purpose does not
properly characterize the original intent of the legislature in
enacting the homestead tax legislation. 0 However, even if one
does accept the purpose of encouraging home ownership, any
justification of the classification requires a showing of "fair and
substantial relation" between the object of the legislation and
the basis for the classification.6 1 It can be argued that these
laws do not so relate, since they have been ineffective in accomplishing the goal of encouraging home ownership. Several
authorities, including a Minnesota Tax Study Committee, have
concluded that any effect in encouraging home ownership has
6
been slight.

2

57. Census Bureau statistics, reproduced in D. NETzER, EcoNo ucs

or THE PRoPERTY TAx 2 (1966) [hereinafter cited as NErZER]; and R.
HATFELD, REPORT TO GovERNoR's MINNEsOTA PRoPERTY TAx STUDy ADVISORY CovnvraE 1-18, 19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HATFIELD REPoRT].

58. Id.
59. 191 Min. at 369, 254 N.W. at 445.
60. However, it could be argued in response that the subsequent
reenactment of the old classifications and the creation of new classifications after such a judicial statement of intent could signify a shift in
legislative intent. The better conclusion would likely be that no specific
intent accompanied reenactment.
61. Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 264, 253 N.W. 102, 107 (1934).
62. GovERNOa's MINNESOTA TAx STUDY CoMna
=,-- supra note 56,
at 5-12; Kilpatrick, supranote 7, at 120-21.
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Moreover, despite the stated purpose, many of those renting,
and virtually all of those in the lower income ranges simply
cannot afford to buy their own homes. The Citizens League 8
estimated in 1969 that 54% of the families in the MinneapolisSt. Paul metropolitan area could not afford to purchase even a
minimally priced new home and that over 35% could not afford
a used home. 64 The result is that they are forced to continue
renting and paying the discriminatory tax rates. The fact is
that the purpose is limited to encouraging home ownership
among those of sufficient financial means. It is not a realistic
encouragement for the poor.
2.

Reasonable Ground for Distinction

To be valid, a classification "must be based on differences
furnishing a reasonable ground for distinction," and one particular reasonable classification would be a distinction "predicated
upon the use made of the property." 65 It is a contention of this
note that the classification involved in the homestead exemption
is not based on the use made of the property, nor on the nature
of the property, but rather on the fact of ownership of the
property.
The early classifications of property in Minnesota were indeed based on the use made of the property or on the nature of
the property. Prior to the 1933 classifications there were three
general classes of real property: real estate in which iron ore
was known to exist, unplatted real estate, and all other real
estate. 66 However, with the passage of the 1933 law, and continuing to the present time, it can be shown that Minnesota in
effect has shifted to a dual system which has both classes of
property and classes of owners or occupants. It seems apparent
that classes such as property containing iron ore deposits, timber land and parking ramps are based on the nature of the property or the use to which it is being put.6 7 However, it seems
equally apparent that classes such as homesteads owned by
63. The Citizens League is a highly respected "independent, nonpartisan educational organization" in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.

64.
LEM 1-2
65.
365, 367,
66.
67.

CITIZENS LEAGUE, ADEQUATE HOUSING IS

Now

EVERYONE'S PROB-

(May 5, 1969).
Apartment Operators' Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 191 Minn.
368, 254 N.W. 443, 444 (1934).
Minn. Laws 1913, ch. 483.
See MINN. STAT. § 273.13(2), (8a), (14) (1969) (as amended).
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paraplegic veterans, or blind or disabled citizens, or homesteads
generally are based on the nature of ownership.08
That precise issue was considered by the Illinois Supreme
Court in the recent case of Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen.6 9 In that case the court ruled that a newly enacted state
constitutional provision prohibiting the taxation of personal
property "as to individuals"7 0 violated the equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. As interpreted by
the court, the provision would have exempted the property of
individuals doing business, but not the property of corporations.
The court stated:
The new article classifies personal property for the purpose of imposing a property tax by valuation, upon a basis that
does not depend upon any of the characteristics of the property that is taxed, or upon the use to which it is put, but
[A) State
solely upon the ownership of the property ....
may not, under the guise of classification, arbitrarily discriminate against one and in favor of another similarly situated.71
Clearly a homestead is used as a residence, no more or no
less than are apartment buildings, duplexes, or rented houses.
Any attempted justification of the homestead exemption cannot,
therefore, be premised on use, but rather must be premised on
the basis of ownership or occupancy. Whether or not there are
"reasonable grounds for distinction" between owner-occupants
and nonowner-occupants must necessarily be considered with
the third rational classification standard.
3.

Uniform Operationon Similarly Circumstanced Persons

It is required that a tax classification operate "equally and
uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances." -2 Accordingly, to justify the homestead exemption on this ground
it must be shown that owner-occupants and nonowner-occupants
either are not similarly circumstanced, or are in fact treated
uniformly.
In discussing the first aspect of this question it is useful to
develop the proposition that the nonowner-occupants of residences (renters) do in fact pay the property taxes on their residences through their rental payments-in other words, that the
68. See MNqN. STAT. § 273.13 (7) (1969) (as amended).
69. 273 N.E.2d 592 (Ill. 1971), noted in 66 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 898 (1972).
70. ILL. CONST. art. IX-A, § 1 (1970 amendment to Constitution of
1870).
71. 273 N.E.2d at 598.
72. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
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tax operates on them. Although this seems to be a plausible,
common sense conclusion, there has been a great deal written
3
It is
on the subject, and there is considerable disagreement
beyond the scope of this note to undertake an adequate analysis
of tax incidence. Nevertheless, a few rather conclusory points
may be made. First, such leading experts in property taxation
as Professor Netzer have accepted the practical validity of the
assumption that residential property taxes are borne by the
occupants. 7 4 Second, whether or not the entire tax burden falls
on the tenant, all writers seem willing to accept the proposition
that part (usually most) of the tax burden does so. 7 5 It would
be well to ask whether, under either assumption, there is any
justification (rational basis) for discriminatory treatment.
Thus it seems that owner-occupants and nonowner-occupants are in fact similarly circumstanced. It remains to be determined whether or not they are treated uniformly. The degree of the discrimination is best illustrated by a simplified example, as in the situation where there are two identical homes,
each with a market value of $12,000 situated side by side in
Minneapolis. The only difference is that home A is occupied by
its owner, and home B is occupied by a renter. The tax on the
owner of home A for the year 1971 would have been $245.70 The
73.

See, e.g., Musgrave, Carroll, Cook & Frene, Distribution of Tax
NAT'L TAX J.
1, 22-23 (1951); Orr, The Incidence of Differential Property Taxes on
Urban Housing, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 253 (1968); Heinberg & Oates, The Incidence of Differential Property Taxes on Urban Housing: A Comment
and Some Further Evidence, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 92 (1970) (responding to
Prof. Orr); Tucker, Distribution of Tax Burdens in 1948, 4 NAT'L TAX J.
269, 278-80 (1951).
74. NETZER, supra note 57 at 45-46. Discussions of the homestead

Payments by Income Groups: A Case Study for 1948, 4

tax exemption itself have acknowledged this point. Consider the following:
In the case of urban property, where the building value is usually so much greater than the site value, the largest part of the
tax bill will undoubtedly be paid by the tenant ....

It is,

however, a definite mistake to assume that the tenant does not
pay a property tax. In fact, if justice and equality are to be

maintained as between homestead owners and tenants, the very
nature of the circumstances require [sic] that if one is to be
granted exemption the other should be given the same consideration.

This particularly applies to urban properties where

the dominant values take the form of improvements.

Arant, Homestead Tax Exemption in Mississippi, 11 Miss. L.J. 167,
196-97 (1938). Cf. DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, MINNESOTA TAX
STUDY 40 (1971); MINNESOTA TAX STUDY COMMISSION, MINNESOTA'S TAX
STRUCTURE 22 (1954).

75. See the authorities cited in note 73 supra.
76. See Table 2 and text accompanying notes 11-25 supra for explanation of the calculations.
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tax on the occupant of home B, levied through the rent payments, would have been $565 (or $475 if reduced by the $90
rent credit) .7 7 Placed in the simplest context, the renter is in
effect being charged a higher tax rate for the municipal services
he receives-schools, sewers, police and fire protection, etc. In
the recent case of Amidon v. Kane,78 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court took particular note of the discriminatory effect on renters in holding the Pennsylvania ungraduated income tax to be
unconstitutional on uniformity grounds. The court noted that
the practical effect of the tax was to tax the income of renters
at a higher rate than home owners. 79 Pennsylvania has been
long noted for its strict interpretation of its uniformity clause,80
and it is not suggested that the Minnesota Supreme Court would
take the Minnesota uniformity clause so far. However, where
the state sets its tax rates so that a renter must pay a higher
rate of tax (94% higher in the example above), the same rationale
should be applicable. A further consideration is that, in the
example, the reduced rate charged to the owner of house A is
made up for in part by increased rates charged on house B and
other non-exempt property,8 ' with the result that those paying
taxes on non-exempt property are in fact subsidizing those occupying homestead exempt property. In Lake Shore Auto Parts
the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
It cannot rationally be said that the prohibition promotes any
policy other than a desire to free one set of property owners
from the burden of a tax imposed upon another set ....
For the purpose of a tax by valuation upon the ownership
of real or personal property, the identity of the owner is a
neutral consideration .... 82
Where there is a greater ability to pay-as in the case of progressive income taxation-justification may be found for taxation at different rates. That and other related issues will be
discussed in a later section.
In sum, the Minnesota homestead tax exemption fails all
the tests of the rational classification standard: (1) the original
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971).
Id. at 61-63.
See Friedman, State Taxation and Constitutional Uniformity,

27 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 276 (1956).

81. The significance of the distinction between the homestead exemption and the homestead tax relief provisions is important in
this context. It is discussed in the text accompanying notes 151-53
infra.
82. 273 N.E.2d at 599.
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object of the legislation is obsolete; (2) the basis of the classification is not substantially related to the purpose of encouraging
home ownership; (3) a substantial number of those feeling the
brunt of the discrimination are effectively foreclosed from enjoying the benefits of the classification; (4) the classification is
not based on use, but rather on ownership or occupancy; and (5)
by causing renters to be taxed at higher rates than home owners, the homestead exemption does not operate equally and uniformly upon all persons similarly circumstanced.

E. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONs/FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS
1. Introduction
The generally accepted statement of the suspect classification/fundamental interest test is found in the dissent of Justice
Harlan in Shapiro v. Thompson:
[S]tatutory classifications which either are based upon certain
"suspect" criteria or affect "fundamental rights" will be held

to deny equal protection unless justified by a "compelling"
governmental interest.8 3
It is noteworthy that there are really two tests. The development of the suspect classifications approach from its early emphasis on race to discriminations relating to voting and to wealth
has already been briefly outlined.8 4 Similar development has
been witnessed with respect to the fundamental interest approach. Included to date among those interests deemed fundamental are voting, procreation, procedural rights in criminal
prosecutions, education and travel.88
It has been suggested that the interaction of the two tests
can be best illustrated by visualizing two gradients.8
The first
would contain suspect classifications, arranged with the most
invidious (presumably race) at the top. The second gradient
would contain various constitutionally protected interests, arranged in order of importance.8 7 Any given issue would be decided by determination of its position on either or both scales.
83.

394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969).

84. See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra.
85. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal procedure); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (education); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (travel). See generally Developments in the Law, supra

note 48, at 1127-31.
86. Developments in the Law, supra note 48, at 1120-21.
87. Id.
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The following sections will attempt first to ascertain the location
of wealth classifications on the suspect classifications gradient,
and then to examine the homestead tax exemption to determine
if it is based on wealth how "fundamental" the interests involved
are.
2. Wealth as a Suspect Classification
It is not necessary to undertake an extensive analysis of the
issue of wealth as a suspect classification. Current literature
has creatively and thoroughly discussed the question,8 8 and a
thumbnail sketch of the development in the area will suffice. It
has been explicitly stated, if by way of dictum, that "a careful
examination ... is especially warranted where lines are drawn
on the basis of wealth or race. . ...80 The first cases, however,
where the wealth classifications doctrine entered into the realm
of equal protection came in the criminal area. In Griffin v.
Illinois9O the United States Supreme Court dealt with the problem of providing free transcripts of trial records for indigent
criminal defendants desiring to appeal their convictions. A
sharply divided Court held that denial of appeal for failure to
purchase the transcript was a denial of due process or equal
protection.9 1 The next significant step in the area of criminal
2
procedure came in Douglas v. California,"
in which it was held
that equal protection required appointment of counsel for indigents for their one appeal guaranteed by California law. In
1966 the concept of wealth as a suspect classification was extended into the poll tax area in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections,9 3 in which the Court struck down Virginia's $1.50 poll
tax. Justice Douglas' opinion stated that "[1] ines drawn on
the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored," and that the fee requirement caused an "in88. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 52, at 348, 358-71;
Michelman, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 19-33 (1969); Developments in the
Law, supra note 48, at 1124; Note, DiscriminationAgainst the Poor and
the FourteenthAmendment, 81 HARv. L. Ruv. 435 (1967).
89. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
90. 351U.S. 12 (1956).
91. Justice Black's opinion for four members of the Court seemed
to be based on both due process and equal protection considerations.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion was grounded solely on equal protection. Id. at 20.
92. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
93. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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vidious" discrimination.9 4 In 1969, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 5
the Court found the one year residency requirement for receipt
of welfare benefits to be an invidious discrimination, and thus a
denial of equal protection. Although the decision was grounded
principally on fundamental interest analysis, specific continued
reference was made to the fact that the discrimination affected
only indigents.
It should be noted that there have been recent cases in
which the Supreme Court has declined to apply the wealth criterion. In Dandridge v. Williams90 the Court upheld Maryland's "standard of need," used to compute AFDC benefits,
which related the maximum grant to the size of the family.
Finding the classification free from any "invidious discrimination," the Court applied the rational basis test and upheld the
classification. In James v. Valtierra9 7 the five justice majority,
per Justice Black, reversed the decision of a three-judge court,
holding that a California constitutional provision requiring community approval by way of referendum for low-rent housing
projects was valid. The majority opinion considered only the
racial issue. The three dissenters, per Justice Marshall, felt that
there was discrimination based on wealth and that the provision
should be struck down on that ground. 9 In Boddie v. Connecticut,99 decided the same term, the Court held refusal by a state
to allow indigents access to its courts for the purpose of seeking
a divorce to be a denial of due process. In separate concurring
opinions, Justices Douglas and Brennan stated that they felt
that it was a case of invidious discrimination based on wealth as
a suspect classification, and that the decision should have been
i0
based on equal protection rather than due process grounds. "
The most recent applications of the theory of wealth as a
suspect classification have been in the area of public school
finance. In Serrano v. Priest,1 01 the California Supreme Court
held that California's public school financing scheme, which relied heavily on local property taxes, which in turn depended
largely on the relative wealth of the various districts, invidiously discriminated against the poor in violation of the equal
94. Id. at 668.

95.
96.
97.

394 U.S. 618 (1969).
397 U.S. 471 (1970).
402 U.S. 137 (1971).

98.

Id. at 143 (dissenting opinion).

99. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
100. Id. at 383, 386 (concurring opinions).
101. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. While
the first cause of action was brought in the name of public school
students in Los Angeles County on behalf of a class consisting of
all public school pupils in California,1 0 2 the second cause of action was brought by the parents as taxpayers, alleging that
"they are required to pay taxes at a higher rate than taxpayers
in many other districts in order to secure for their children the
same or lesser educational opportunities." 0 3 The court held
that the parent taxpayers had clearly stated a cause of action
since the county tax officials could be enjoined from carrying
out the provisions of the law if the law was unconstitutional.' 0
To date there have been at least five decisions in other states
following the general lines of Serrano, with numerous actions of
a like nature pending. 0 5 Since the Serrano decision the United
States Supreme Court has not addressed itself to the issue, but
an appeal has been filed from the decision of a three-judge federal court in the Texas case of Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District.00 It is likely that a decision in this area
will resolve some of the uncertainty as to the status of wealth
classifications.
3.

The Homestead Tax Exemption--Invidious Discrimination
and FundamentalInterests
(a.)

Invidious Discrimination

Traditionally, part of the objection to the real property tax
itself has been its inherently regressive features. 0 7 Analysis of
the relative burdens borne by home owners with various levels
of income shows that the "tax effort" required to produce a
given amount of tax revenue through property taxes is much
greater for those with lower incomes than for those with higher
incomes (who incidentally tend to own more valuable property).1° s Indeed, recognition of this problem was inherent in
the recent decision by the California Supreme Court in Serrano
102. Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
103. Id. at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.

104. Id.
105. The cases are collected and noted in Note, The Evolution of
Equal Protection-Education,Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7 HARv.
Civ. RIGHTS-CV. L.

L. Rrv. 103, 200-13 (1972).

106. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W.
3513 (Apr. 17, 1972) (No. 71-1332).
107. See generally NETZER, supra note 57, at 3-8.
108. Id. at 45-59. Cf. HATirEm RPoaRT, supra note 57, at 3-36.
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v. Priest.0 9 In holding that California's system of public school
financing, which is based largely on the property tax, violated
equal protection requirements, the court recognized that the collective effort of a poor district (as compared with the individual
effort of a poor taxpayer) to provide adequate education was
much greater than that required of a rich district. 1 0
While the real property tax seems to favor the wealthy
by placing a lesser proportionate burden on them, the homestead tax exemption requires that non-homeowner taxpayers
(i.e., renters) pay a higher rate of tax because of the classification."
The result is that non-homeowner taxpayers not only
bear a greater burden as a result of the regressive features of
the property tax, but that they must pay an absolutely higher
rate of taxes. This section of the note will examine the suspect
classification doctrine and apply the constitutional criteria, as
developed by the courts, to the Minnesota homestead tax exemption.
(1)

The Premises

There are two premises upon which the invidious discrimination analysis rests, as applied to the Minnesota homestead tax
exemption. The first is that the renters are in effect the ones
who pay the taxes on the dwellings in which they reside. This
contention has already been developed under the head of "rational classifications,"' 1 2 and no further development will be undertaken at this point.
The second premise used to substantiate the claim that the
homestead tax exemption constitutes an invidious discrimination based on wealth is that absence of home ownership is an
incident of poverty. 1 3 In the past, when most wealth was held
in the form of real property, it might have been more appropriate to state the proposition that home ownership was an incident
of wealth. Today, however, when much wealth is in the form
of intangible property, and when many wealthy persons live in
apartments, the validity of the assertion would be more subject
to challenge. Support for the notion that absence of home
ownership is an incident of poverty is abundant in the literature
109.
110.

111.
112.

113.

5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
Id. at 599-600, 487 P.2d at 1251-52, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.

Compare the figures in Table 2 supra.

See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.

Or, stated otherwise, poor people cannot afford to buy homes.
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in the area. 114 Examination of the situation currently existing
in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area reinforces the conclusion. It has been estimated by the Citizens League that 54%
of the families in the metropolitan area cannot afford to buy
even a minimally priced new home, and that 35% cannot afford
a used one. 115 That, coupled with the estimates that over half
of those families either cannot afford (or are paying more than
they can "afford" by HUD standards) even the "average" onebedroom apartment, 1" 6 lends strong support to the common sense
conclusion that absence of home ownership is an incident of
poverty.
Further support for this contention can be found in the
1970 census figures. According to those figures, of nearly 150,000
households in Minneapolis in 1970, about 45% lived in owneroccupied units.11 7 However, of those households with incomes
under the poverty level, only about 24% lived in owner-occupied
units. 8 It is noteworthy that of those persons with poverty
incomes, about 25% were over 65 years of age. 119 It is likely
that they account for many, if not most, of the owner-occupied
units in that category. It is probable, therefore, that if one excludes retired persons from the analysis, it will be found that
the home ownership percentages for those households with poverty level incomes would be small indeed.
(2)

The Effect of the Homestead Tax Exemption

The effects of the homestead tax exemption have already
been discussed. 20 To recapitulate briefly, in the example of
identical $12,000 homes, one occupied by the owner and the other
by a renter, the renter was required to pay property tax at a
rate 94% higher than the home owner. Because of the home114. See, e.g., NETzER, supra note 57, at 40, 54; HATFIELD REPORT,
supra note 57, at 7-10.

115. CrIzENs LEAGUE, ADEQUATE HOUSING IS Now EVERYONE'S PROBLEM 1-2 (May 5, 1969).
116. AD Hoc CoIM flER FOR A WORKABLE HousING POLICY, A CRITIcIsM OF MINNEAPOLIs' 1969 WORKABLE PROGRAM AND HousING, URBAN
RENEWAL, AND CODE ENFORCEMENT POLICIES WHmcH IT REP ESENTS 6-7
(June 18, 1970) [hereinafter cited as AD Hoc REPORT].
117. UITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BuRAU OF THIE
CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, GENERAL SOCIAL AND EcoNozmc
[hereinafter
CHARACTERISTICS, 1INNESOTA at p. 25-310, Table 90 (1971)

cited as GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARAcTERISTICS].
118. Id.
119. Id.

120. See Table 2 and text accompanying notes 31-32 and 76-77 supra.
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stead exemption the renter is charged at a higher rate than
home owners for identical municipal services. Yet, as illustrated
above, renters have proportionately less ability to pay. Moreover, it is ironic that in many cases families cannot afford to buy
even minimally priced housing, yet are forced to pay even higher
property taxes on rental units that are either substandard or
which rent for more than they can afford. 12 1 Moreover, it has
been shown that those in non-exempt property are required to
subsidize those in homestead property. 12 2 When considered in
light of the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the poor are
forced to subsidize the rich.
(b.)

Fundamental Interests

Although the keystone of this discussion has been the invidious discrimination based on wealth, it is appropriate to engage in a brief discussion of the interests involved.
(1)

Education

Ever since the historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education 123 commentators have ranked education among those interests deemed fundamental. Indeed, this assumption has been a
vital part of the recent school financing decisions.' 2 4 In Minnesota, renters are required to pay taxes at a higher rate for
identical educational services (and the payments are indeed significant-56% of every property tax dollar goes to finance education).125 In Serrano the parents as taxpayers alleged that
they were "required to pay taxes at a higher rate than taxpayers
in many other districts in order to secure for their children the
same or lesser educational opportunities.' 1 26 The only difference in Minnesota is that renter taxpayers must pay taxes at a
higher rate than their neighbors who own their own homes.
121.

Figures cited in AD Hoc

123.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

REPORT,

supra note 116, at 7 indicate

that 94.7% of Minneapolis' substandard units are occupied by low and
moderate income people-not a surprising statistic.
122. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra. Also, see text accompanying notes 151-53 infra for a discussion of the distinction between
the homestead exemption and the homestead tax relief provisions.
124. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 589, 487 P.2d 1241,
1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 (1971).
125. MiNNESOTA DEPARTMENT
SOTA TAX GUIDE 6 (1970).

126.

OF EcoNolVnc

DEVELOPMENT,

5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
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Municipal Services

In recent years there has been an increasing awareness of
a fundamental interest in equal municipal services. 12 7 The Serrano opinion dealt strictly with the educational rights involved,
being careful to express no views on the applicability of the
suspect classification rationale to other tax-supported public services.128 The court did, however, take note of the Fifth Circuit
decision in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,109 which held that discrimination on the basis of race by a municipality in providing
municipal services was a denial of equal protection. Plaintiffs
in that case had originally alleged discrimination on the basis of
wealth as well but dropped that claim on appeal. The court
noted, however, that classification based on wealth is suspect,
130
just as is classification based on race.
As with educational services, Minnesota renters are not necessarily provided with inferior services, but they must pay
more money for the same services. In Minnesota the issue is
wealth more than race, but in fact it is frequently difficult to
separate the two. 1970 census figures show that about 68% of
the white households in Minnesota live in owner occupied units,
whereas only about 38% of the black households enjoy the same
benefit.' 3 1 Stated otherwise, 62% of the black households in
Minnesota are taxed at the higher rate because they do not
qualify for the homestead exemption. The race factor is inexorably tied in with the poverty factor: the same figures show
that 23% of all black households in Minnesota have incomes
132
below the poverty level, and of these, 78% live in rented units.
(3)

Housing

The other side of the fundamental interest coin in Minnesota
is the interest in housing. While renters are being required to
pay a higher rate of tax for their municipal services, their hous127. See Abascal, Municipal Services and Equal Protection: Variations on a Theme by Griffin v. Illinois, 20 HASTlNGS L.J. 1367 (1969);
Ratner, Inter-NeighborhoodDenials of Equal Protectionin the Provision
of Municipal Services, 4 HARv. Crv. RIGHTs-Civ. Li. L. REv. 1 (1968);
Note, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education,Municipal Services,
and Wealth, 7 HAnv. Crv. R Gms-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 103 (1972).
128. 5 CaL 3d at 614, 487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
129. 437 F.2d 1286 (Sth Cir. 1971).
130. Id. at 1287 nl.
131. Gnmaem SocIAL AND ECONOMIC CARACTERisTiCS, supra note 117,
at p. 25-249, Table 58.
132. Id.
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ing costs are being pushed up by the differential taxation. Accordingly, it can be asserted that the classification affects their
fundamental interest in adequate housing.
This assertion flies in the face of one of the justifications
frequently offered for differential taxation, viz., that cost advantages inherent in apartment living make rental costs lower
by their very nature. However, it seems as if this justification is
based on circular reasoning. There is abundant support for the
contention that the discriminatory tax system has resulted in a
situation in which relatively high rents are charged for units
of relatively low quality (and value). The value of the "average" house in Minneapolis is $19,632.133 The 1971 property tax
on a dwelling of that value, if rented, would be about $925, or
roughly $77 per month. Based on statistics which show that
property taxes comprise about 28% of the average monthly rent
bill in Minneapolis, 1 34 a dwelling with that "average" value
could be expected to cost about $275 per month to rent-an
amount beyond the financial means of the "average" renter.
Those statistics, juxtaposed with the estimate that 54% of the
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area residents cannot afford
even a minimally priced new house, and 35% cannot afford an
old one, 13 5 lead to the unavoidable conclusion that the only
choice for lower income families is to accept low quality, low
value rental housing. There is nothing inherently less expensive about rental over ownership.
It is expected that such a conclusion would be strengthened
by examination of data relating to the percentage of income for
property tax payments for various income groups. However
there does not appear to be any data giving that information for
Minnesota. The Hatfield Report did present the following data
on the relationship between income and property tax for married persons in Minnesota who own and occupy their own
homes: 136
133.

GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 117,
The census data are compiled in METROPOLITAN
COUNCIL, TWIN CITIES METROPOLITAN AREA MUNICIPAL HOUSING PROFILE

at 25-310, Table 90.

17 (1971).
134. DEVELOPMENT
Table A-12 (1971).

RESEARCH

ASSOCIATES,

MINNESOTA

TAX

STUDY

135. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
136. HATFIELD REPORT, supra note 57, at 111-36. Appendix A contains the detailed statistics for all counties and selected cities and

villages. Those data place Minneapolis above the state average, but it is
expected that the percentage differentials would carry over for Minneapolis renters as well.
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$ 2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
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Property Tax as
Percent of Income
6.16
4.09
3.21
2.71
2.37
2.13

14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000

1.94
1.79
1.68
1.57

If one takes the generally accepted standard of 25% as being
the proportion of monthly income which a family can "afford"
to devote to housing,13 7 it is possible to arrive at some comparable figures for renters. Using such a standard, a family with
$6,000 income can "afford" $125 per month rent (whether they
could find a suitable rental dwelling for that price, especially
with children, is questionable). Using .28 to determine the property tax paid,138 such a family would pay $420 in property tax
($125 x .28 x 12), or 7% of income, as compared with 3.21% in
the Hatfield Report statistics. Although such data are not available for renters, it is expected that the pattern would hold up
throughout the range of incomes.
The constitutional status of housing as a fundamental interest is uncertain. In James v. Valtierra,"39 the Supreme Court
declined to specifically denominate the interest in adequate housing as being fundamental. The Court took a similar approach in
the recent case of Lindsey v. Normet 140 when it refused to sanction a constitutional right to withhold rent, while simultaneously striking down the requirement that bond be posted by the
tenant in an amount equal to twice the amount of the rent on
the ground that it discriminated against the poor.1 "1
(c.)

No Compelling State Interest

Along with the search for invidious discriminations and
fundamental interests, courts have generally looked for "compelling state interests." This section will discuss various potential
state interests offered in support of the homestead tax exemp137.

AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 116 at 6-7; Crmms LEAGUE, ADE-

QUATE HOUSING IS Now EVERYONE'S PROBLEM 1 (May 5,

138.
139.

See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
402 U.S. 137 (1971).

140. 40 U.S.L.W. 4184, 4190 (Feb. 23, 1972).
141. Id. at 4191.

1969).
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tion to discover whether they are "compelling" or even "rational."
(1)

Ability to Pay

One of the classic arguments used to support any tax is
ability to pay. 142 In light of the foregoing materials, there is
little to be said in support of the contention that the burdens of
the homestead exemption fall on those who have the greater
ability to pay. It is true that business property absorbs part of
the burden, and it is arguable that there is a greater ability to
pay inherent in business operations. But it has been shown that
as between home owners and renters, all rightly classed as residents, the burden falls on the renters, the group with proportionately less ability to pay.
(2)

Benefit

Where one class of individuals derives more governmental
benefit a higher tax rate may be justified. 1 43 Under the prevailing circumstances it seems clear that renters are paying substantially higher taxes for precisely the same benefits received
as those qualifying for homestead exemptions. As indicated
above, in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, it was held that it was a
denial of equal protection for a municipality to provide inferior
municipal services to a sector of its population which constituted
a racial minority.1 44 The court intimated that the same "suspect
classification" treatment would apply if the discrimination were
based on wealth. Similarly, it is indefensible to charge a higher
rate of taxes for the same municipal services, based entirely
on property ownership.
(3)

Purpose-Encourage Home Ownership

This particular aspect of state interest has been discussed in
an earlier section,14 5 and a brief recapitulation will suffice. In
response to the contention that one of the valid state interests
is encouragement of home ownership, two points can be made.
First, any effect that the homestead tax exemption has had in
142.

See, e.g., J.

JENSEN, PRoPERTY TAXATION IN

THE UNITED STATES

78-84 (1931). Cf. Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 266, 253 N.W. 102,
108 (1934).
143. Id.
144. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
145. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
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increasing the growth of home ownership has been insignificant.
Second, because of the economic realities of poverty, substantial
segments of the population cannot realistically hope to purchase
homes. For them, the state interest is not a genuine encouragement. They are effectively foreclosed from the benefits of the
exemption.

F. CAN Tm HoiwmsTEA
ivrwTs iN FAVOR

TAX EXEMPTION BE JUSTUIED?-ARGu-

In addition to those arguments discussed under "state interests" (ability to pay, benefit and purpose), it is anticipated
that other justifications might be offered in support of the homestead exemption.
1.

Relative Effect

The relative effect argument introduces certain complexities
into the analysis. It can be argued that the difference between
the tax that is presently levied on, for example, a large apartment building and the tax that would be levied if the building
qualified for the homestead tax exemption is minimal For example, it can be shown that the 1971 property tax on a $120,000
home (or other building qualifying for the exemption) in Minneapolis would have been $5,186. The tax on a 10 unit, $120,000
apartment building in Minneapolis would have been about
$5,648-only $462, or 9% more. Accordingly, the argument
would go, the tax savings would have been only $46 per unit,
not really a significant amount.
However, it is unrealistic to compare the 10 unit building
with a $120,000 home rather than with dwellings with similar
per unit costs. The 10 unit building is an aggregation of ten
$12,000 units and should be so treated. Each unit would have
paid a tax of $565 (or $475, allowing for rent credit of $90),
which is, taking the second amount, $230, or 94% greater than a
$12,000 dwelling unit qualifying for the homestead tax exemption.
Such a contention is consistent with, if not required by, the
previously stated requirement that the classification operate
"equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances."'1 4 6 One example of similarly circumstanced persons
can be found in condominium or cooperative apartments. Min146. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
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nesota has a statute providing for homestead exemption treatment of these apartments. 1 47 Likewise, the homestead definition used in Minnesota's property tax relief provisions for senior
citizens specifically includes rented dwellings in multiple-unit
buildings. 1 48 To meet the requirement of uniform operation of
the law, each unit in a multiple dwelling building should be
compared with other dwelling units having similar per unit
values.
2.

Mitigating Features

It can be shown that there are provisions tending to mitigate
the adverse effects on renters. The Minnesota legislature passed
rent credit legislation in 1967 which allows renters, under certain circumstances, a direct tax credit of up to $45;149 in 1971 the
maximum amount was increased to $90.150 While the credit does
benefit the renter, it does not compare in scope with the simultaneously-passed homestead tax relief credit in the amount of
35% of the property tax (already calculated at a lower rate), up
to $250. So, while the credit did provide some relief for the
renter, the gap in actual taxes paid widened as soon as the credit
passed. In short, the credit does nothing to mitigate the degree
of the discrimination.
3. Injury
There are some difficult conceptual problems in this area as
well. The first relates to the issue of whether actual injury has
been shown. In support of the tax it could be argued that if a
party challenged the exemption the only effect would be for
another to lose the benefit, rather than for him to gain some part
of it. In other words, it would be argued that an equal protection claim cannot be made merely on the ground of benefit
accruing to another.' 5 ' The reply is that those "not benefiting"
from the exemption are indeed being injured by it. The rationThe
(first enacted in 1967).
147. MINN. STAT. § 273.133 (1969)
fact that individual property tax treatment is a prerequisite for FHA

mortgage insurance (24 C.F.R. § 234.26 (d) (3)) will no doubt contribute
to widespread similarity in tax treatment of such units.
148. MINN. STAT. § 290.0601 (1969) (as amended).
149. See MINN. STAT. §§ 290.981-992 (1969).
150.

Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 31, art. 8, § 6 (Extra Session).

151. While not standard constitutional doctrine, such an approach has
been advanced. The problem is discussed in Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for
State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 408 & n.279 (1969).
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ale is that the homestead tax exemption weakens the tax base,
and the reduced assessments must be compensated for by a
higher tax rate on nonexempt property. Nonexempt tax-payers
are indeed being injured in that they are in fact paying the taxes
that the exempt taxpayers are being relieved of. It is recognized
that if the tax base for a given taxing jurisdiction were comprised almost exclusively of homestead property, or almost exclusively of non-homestead property, that the aggregate disparity of burdens would not be too severe. In Minneapolis, however, it is expected that the aggregate impact would be significant. Although figures indicating total market value of
homestead property relative to non-homestead are not presently
available, there is a rough numerical equality of owner-occupied
and rental dwelling units in Minneapolis. 152 Although the precise additional burden borne by occupants of rented structures
is difficult to ascertain, it seems clear that it is significant.
The argument does have some validity with respect to the
homeowners tax credit provisions. By these provisions the
property tax on a homestead is further reduced by 35%, up to
$250.153 However, in this case lost revenues are replaced by
state funds derived from the sales tax rather than directly by
higher levies on nonexempt taxpayers. While it may be contended that it is still unfair to give the wealthy an additional
bonus of up to $250 (i.e., a lower rate of taxes), it is true that the
lower rate is not directly funded by those not owning property.
Additionally, there is a further mitigating factor: the rent credit.
By virtue of the rent credit renters do receive a direct
"bonus," although not nearly so great as property owners. Before 1971, when the credit was limited to $45, it represented
little more than the amount of tax savings realized by the home
owner by virtue of the state income tax deduction allowed for
the property taxes he had paid. However, the 1971 increase to
$90 does give the rent credit greater value; but is is still significantly less than the homeowners property tax credit of up to

$250.
In summary, the homestead tax exemption definitely is detrimental to those not qualifying for the exemption, since those
qualifying are allowed to pay a lower rate of taxes at the direct
expense of those not qualifying. Although the inequality is ac152. GENERAL HousiNG CHARACTEmTiCS, supra note 117, at p. 25-15,
Table 8. The census information is compiled in Mmoporrv COuNCIL,
TwiN CIzIEs AETRopoLrrAN AREA MuNICIPAL HousING PRoFILE 17 (1971).
153. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
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centuated by the homestead tax relief provision (even balanced
against the rent credit), the detriment is not as direct and does
not present quite as appealing a case for unconstitutionality on
the grounds of equal protection.
4.

Questions for the Legislature-Remedy

Another objection might be termed the "political question
argument." That is, this is a problem uniquely legislative in
nature and the solutions should be sought there, not in the
courts.15 4 The simple fact is that the legislature is highly unlikely to do away with such preferential tax treatment of its
own volition. One reason is the substantial percentage of homeowners in Minnesota-it would be politically unattractive to do
away with a tax exemption benefiting a significant portion of
the population. 155 Another factor is that renters simply are not
aware of the degree of disparity of treatment. They have a notion that good rental housing is expensive, but they simply do
not know how much in taxes is tucked away into the monthly
rent bill. As a result, they do not represent a strong political
force working for change. In short, the system is well entrenched with little real hope of change without judicial ac56
tion.'
Another very real concern voiced regarding the desirability
of judicial action in traditionally legislative areas centers on
available remedies. The question arises: What can a court do
to remedy the injustice? It appears that by far the most desirable alternative is "remand to the legislature." Just as in
cases of school desegregation,' 57 legislative reapportionment 5 "
and school financing, 59 there is no need to invalidate past actions taken under the existing scheme or to immediately implement a constitutionally adequate scheme. The existing system
154. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Scharpf,
Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
155. Statistics indicate that 71.5% of Minnesota dwelling units are
owner-occupied. GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 117, at
p. 25-8, Table 2.
156. The truth of the proposition was recognized even when homestead exemptions were quite new, in Melton's statement that "there is
not the slightest chance that the exemption will be repealed." Melton,
Homestead Tax Exemption in TAx EXEMPTION 188, 200-01 (1939).
157.

158.
159.

Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964).

Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr.

601 (1971).
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should be allowed to remain in effect until the legislature is
given an opportunity to act. Although legislative inaction under such circumstances does not seem a likely probability, a
judicially imposed remedy for an invalid tax classification would
certainly seem to be much more easily formulated than in, for
example, legislative reapportionment cases. An order enjoining
classification of homesteads under the law would have the virtue
of equalizing the tax burden rapidly.
5. Analogy to FederalIncome Tax
Another argument might point out some of the similar inequities in treatment under the federal income tax laws. It can
be shown, for example, that the interest and tax deductions allowed homeowners under the federal laws constitute preferential treatment, whereas renters are not given any special deductions. It might be argued that the express discrimination in
the property tax structure by way of the homestead exemption
is therefore justified. There are several responses to this argument. First, the existence of the standard deduction diminishes
the effect of the discrimination in the federal tax, particularly
at the lower levels of income. Second, in theory at least, the
federal income tax is "progressive," whereas the Minnesota
homestead tax exemption has been demonstrated to be regressive
to the extent of charging absolutely higher rates to renters on
the basis of non-ownership of property. Third, the homestead
exemption gives a "multiplier effect" to the features of the federal deductions. Whereas the federal deductions already allow
homeowners to reduce their property taxes by a certain percentage (or, stated otherwise, reduce their income taxes by a
percentage of their property taxes), the homestead exemption
exacerbates the situation by increasing the burden on the renter
-who already derives no benefit from the federal deductions.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM
There are several reasons why ultimate resolution of the
homestead exemption problem by the legislature would be the
most desirable alternative. First, there are difficult policy questions involved: e.g., whether the other classes of property should
continue to enjoy preferential (or suffer discriminatory) treatment; whether the state should bear some of the redistributed
burdens; how it can be required that tax savings be passed on
to occupants of rental dwellings. Another important aspect is
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the difficulty involved in fashioning a satisfactory remedy. As
suggested, the alternative of "remanding to the legislature"
would be a logical choice to minimize the remedy problems.
The range of legislative alternatives is, of course, wide. One
obvious alternative would be to simply eliminate the classes of
property and tax it all similarly, while at the same time eliminating the associated tax credits. A less sweeping proposal would
call for a sharp reduction of the number of classes of property.
The Hatfield Report recommends establishment of two classes of
property. 160 Class I would include residential, seasonal-recreational residential, and agricultural real estate; Class II would
include business, commercial, and industrial real property and
business personal property. 6 1 All property would be valued at
100% of its market value, and then, for tax computation purposes, Class I property would be reduced to 50%.102 However,
that recommendation would place any apartment complex with
more than three units into the business category. 10 3 In light of
the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that this aspect of the
proposal must be rejected-it is imperative that any residential
property be viewed as an aggregate of individual dwelling units.
Accordingly, all residential units would properly fall within the
scope of Class I if the Hatfield Report recommendations, as
modified, were to be adopted.
The Hatfield Report does, however, present some alternative
relief provisions for rented housing. It suggests first that the
Minnesota tax laws be revised to allow renters to deduct the
portion of their rent which represents property taxes.10 " It suggests also that the rent credit be abolished and replaced with a
rent credit aimed at relief for low income taxpayers.'10
Although such a plan does seem to address itself to the most serious
aspect of the problem, it preserves the inequality of treatment
by maintaining the different tax rates.
The alternative which would probably cause the least disruption would be to accord all dwelling units, whether renter
or owner-occupied, the present homestead treatment. As previously pointed out, this would not be a drastic departure from
160.
161.
162.
163.

HATIELD REPORT, supra note 57,

Id. at 11-105.
Id. at 11-104.
Id. at 11-107.

164. Id. at VII-9 to 12.

165. Id.

at pp. 11-103 to 113.
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existing doctrine. 166 The legislative scheme presently according senior citizens tax relief does extend its definition of homestead to include rented dwelling units.' c0 However, this would
seem to be the least desirable method of eliminating the inequality of treatment, since it would preserve the unwieldy structure
of multiple classifications, while simultaneously shifting additional burdens to non-exempt property.
Another possibility is the suggestion made by the Citizens
League that assessed valuation be expanded to take into account valuation per capita, income per dwelling, the number of
occupants per dwelling and income level of the occupants.1 0 8
Although such a practice would undoubtedly introduce additional complexities into the system, it would have the virtue of
at least being more equitable. Additionally, elimination of the
complexities of the current system would probably result in an
overall simplification, even with a new system of assessed valuation.
Whatever method of implementing reform is chosen, it
would seem desirable that certain legislation should accompany
the equalization enactments. First, as part of the residential
tax rate equalization legislation, there should be a provision requiring that the savings from the resultant roll-back in taxes on
rental dwelling units be passed on to the tenants.0 9 Second,
it would seem desirable as a policy matter to impose a limit on
the property tax level and make up for the possible revenue
lost by additional state taxes to be paid to the property taxing
jurisdictions. 170 This would have the dual virtue of softening
the impact on those presently enjoying benefits while simultaneously equalizing the burdens.
The recommendations contained in this section are suggestive, not dispositive. However, they do illustrate potential solutions to a problem of discrimination that cannot go unsolved.
166. See text accompanying notes 147-48 supra.
167. MINN. STAT. § 290.0601 (1969) (as amended).
168. CrzNs LEAGUE, NEvW FoamiuLAs FOR REvENuE SHARING IN MINNESOTA 35-36 (Sept. 1, 1970).

169. It is recognized that this might be initially inequitable to the
apartment owner (or more probably the duplex or fourplex owner)
who has absorbed some of the tax increases over time. However, it
seems certain that the net effect would be favorable, especially in that
it would prevent windfall profits for apartment owners in areas where
supply and demand factors could not be relied upon to immediately
push down rents. Moreover, the necessary marginal adjustments could
be made over a period of time.
170. This recommendation is advanced in the HATFmnD REPoRT, supra
note 57, at pp. VI-i to 9.
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CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis of the Minnesota homestead tax exemption and the homestead property tax relief provisions has
shown that there is a wide disparity in property taxation in
Minnesota. Non-homestead property is taxed at rates significantly higher than those in effect for homestead propertyparticularly in the range of lower values. As a result, those
who must rent are forced to pay a significantly higher property
tax-nearly double in many cases-through their rents. The
problem is not new, and it has been recognized in other analyses
that the greatest impact is on those who fall into the lower in17 1
come brackets.
The legal aspects of the problem have been approached from
both the more traditional rational classification approach and
the activist suspect classifications/fundamental interest approach. In the rational classification area, despite old precedents
upholding the homestead tax exemption, there is ample authority for a reconsideration of the issues. The homestead tax exemption is vulnerable to challenge using each of the three
standards enunciated by the Minnesota Supreme Court for judging the rationality of a classification: (1) substantial relation to
the object of the legislation; (2) reasonable ground for distinction;
and (3) uniform operation upon similarly circumstanced persons.
Additionally, it has been shown that the homestead tax exemption does indeed constitute a discriminatory classification
based on wealth. Since the exemption constitutes an invidious
discrimination, since it impinges on the fundamental interests of
education, municipal services and housing, and since there is no
compelling state interest to justify it, it should be declared to
be a violation of the uniformity and equal protection provisions
of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions.
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